Fuerzas Nucleares Chinas.kmz

Chinese Nuclear Forces
Hans M. Kristensen (hkristensen@fas.org), Robert S. Norris (rnorris@nrdc.org) and Matthew G. McKinzie (mmckinzie@nrdc.org)
The Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (www.nrdc.org)
November 2006
An incipient nuclear arms race is emerging between the United States and China. The U.S.- Chinese nuclear arms race is not on the scale of that between the United States and the Soviet Union that threatened the world with peril for four decades, but it shows worrisome signs of intensifying. This wasteful and potentially dangerous competition still can be avoided if wiser heads on both sides prevail and ensure that military competition and worst-case planning do not undermine and complicate the far more extensive and important economic, political, and cultural relationship between the two giants.
To better understand the nuclear relationship between China and the United States, the dynamics that drive it, and its potential consequences, our report first examines Chinese nuclear forces in some detail, including their past development, their current status, and what future programs are underway according to the U.S. government’s assessments and other sources. We then provide a history of U.S. nuclear targeting of China – although much is still shrouded in secrecy, and conclude by simulating two hypothetical nuclear strike scenarios that are likely to be close approximations of actual war plans: a U.S. strike against Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile silos and a Chinese strike against U.S. cities.
Here we present some of this research in a format that can be interactively explored using Google Earth. The full report can be found at http:www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm

DF-4 Missiles at Delingha, China
Initially deployed in 1980, the DF-4 was the first Chinese ballistic missile capable of hitting Guam, a base used for forward deployment of U.S. nuclear bombers and submarines since the early 1960s. The decision to develop the missile was made in May 1965,160 shortly after the U.S. Navy began strategic deterrent patrols in the Pacific with ballistic missile submarines from Guam.
One of the rumored deployment areas for the DF-4 is the Delingha area in the Qinghai province in central China where the 414th Brigade is believed to be based. At least two launch sites appear to be operational approximately 17 miles (27 km) (Figure 22) and 19 miles (30 km) (Figure 23), respectively, west of the town of Delingha. Both launch sites have the same basic layout: A 230-foot (70-meter) wide concrete circle, a large garage that is large enough to contain two or more DF-4 missiles mounted on their erect launchers, half a dozen fuel trucks, one to two dozen cabins and a couple of office buildings.
Approximately 10 miles (17 km) further to the west are what may be five additional, but apparently abandoned, launch sites. They may have been operational in the 1980s when China’s nuclear deterrent was principally focused against the Soviet Union, but were abandoned either because the targets shifted and/or the missile force was reduced. A possible location for the 414th Brigade Headquarters is Delingha Nongchang, approximately halfway between Delingha and the launch sites. The site includes what might be a launch site, including three missile garages, a launch pad, and a number of service vehicles (Figure 24).
For all of the (possibly) identified DF-4 launch sites, it is striking how vulnerable they are to attack. Their small size and the apparent storage of the missiles in garages on the surface makes it unnecessary to even resort to nuclear weapons use in a counterforce attack on these facilities. A single successful bomber sortie with a precision bomb (even a Special Operations Forces unit on the ground) would be sufficient to put a launch site out of operation.
The full report "Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning" can be found at www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm

Delingha DF-4 (northwest site): Launch Pad

Delingha DF-4 (northwest site): Underground Garage

Delingha DF-4 (northwest site): Fuel and Service Vehicle

Delingha DF-4 (northwest site): Missile Garage

Delingha DF-4 (northwest site): Barracks

Delingha DF-4 (southeast site): Launch Pad

Delingha DF-4 (southeast site): Fuel Trucks

Delingha DF-4 (southeast site): Service Vehicles

Delingha DF-4 (southeast site): Barracks

Delingha DF-4 (southeast site): Missile Garage

Delingha DF-4 (abandoned site)

City of Delingha, Qinghai Province

Delingha DF-4 (possible headquarters)

Delingha DF-4 (possible headquarters): Launch Pad

Delingha DF-4 (possible headquarters): Garrison HQ Building

Delingha DF-4 (possible headquarters): Missile Garages

Delingha DF-4 (possible headquarters): Service Vehicles

Possible DF-3A Missiles at Yidu, China
The DF-3A is “China’s primary regional missile system,” the US Department of Defense (DOD) stated in 2000. Today however, more than half of the missiles have been withdrawn from service and the weapon system is undergoing retirement. The DF-3A is a road-mobile, liquid-fueled IRBM that can be launched from either a permanent launch pad or portable launch stand.146 It carries a 3.3 Mt warhead and has a range of up to 1,925 miles (3,100 km).147 The weapon is most likely used to target Russia, India, and U.S. bases in Japan.
One of the rumored locations for the DF-3A is Yidu in the Shandong district in eastern China (although mainly rumored to be a DF-3 location, Yidu may have been converted to DF-21). The precise locations are unknown but approximately five miles (eight km) south of Yidu are two sites that might be launch facilities. The western site has a 265-foot (80-meter) wide concrete pad adjacent to a 131 x 40 feet (40 x 12 meters) building large enough to house two DF-3A missiles. The eastern site has a smaller 131-foot (40-meter) pad adjacent to a 115 x 56 feet (35 x 17 meters) building. It should be emphasized that it is not known whether these two sites are indeed launch facilities, but their layout suggest that they might serve such a role.
It should be emphasized that it is not known whether these two sites are indeed launch facilities, but their large circular pads are similar to other sites that have missile roles.
The full report "Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning" can be found at www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm

Yidu DF-3A (?) (western site): Launch Pad

Yidu DF-3A (?) (western site): Missile Garage

Yidu DF-3A (?) (eastern site): Missile Garage

Yidu DF-3A (?) (eastern site): Launch Pad

City of Yidu, Shandong District, China

Possible DF-21 Missiles at Suixi Air Base, China
The DF-21 is a road-mobile missile carried in and launched from a launch canister mounted on a towed transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The US Department of Defense (DOD) says that China deploys two versions (Mod 1 and Mod 2), designated as DF-21 and DF-21A, respectively. The weapon system continues to supplement the aging inventory of liquid-fueled DF-3As. The missile’s range is normally listed as 1,100+ miles (1,770+ km), but the classified range for DF-21 Mod 1 appears to be 1,340 miles (2,150 km).
The DF-21 is rumored to be deployed in at least three locations in three of China's provinces, but nothing is known for sure and other locations may be used as well. If so, one potential other location may the Suixi (Liancheng) airbase in southern China. Satellite imagery shows a large rectangular area with an assembly of dozens of vehicles. Although the resolution of the image makes identification of the vehicles difficult, 22 of the vehicles appear to be approximately 34 to 46 feet (13 to 14 meters) long and consist of a truck with a 33 to 36 feet (10 to 11 meters) long trailer.
The DF-21 reportedly is 35 feet (10.7 meters) long. The surface of the launch canister that contains the DF-21 missile is not smooth but has several large protrusions and other features that might account for the uneven appearance of the large vehicles in the image. But it should be emphasized that it is by no means certain that the vehicles identified on the satellite image are indeed DF-21 launchers; they may simply be trucks transporting surface-to-air missiles for a SAM site at the base.
Deployment of DF-21s at Suixi Airbase would, if true, raise some interesting questions. First, since the Pentagon estimates that China has only 34 to 38 DF-21 launchers, the relatively large number of possible DF-21 launchers visible in the satellite image would make Suixi one of the major deployment areas. Second, with a range of approximate 1,330 miles (2,100 km), DF-21s would not be able to target India from Suixi. They would, however, be in striking range of the Philippines and the Taiwan area.
The full report "Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning" can be found at www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm

DF-21 Launch Vehicles or SAM Trucks

DF-21 Launch Vehicle or SAM Truck

Temporary SAM Site

SAM Site under Construction

Suixi Air Base Main Runway

Underground Shelter

Railhead

Protective Aircraft Shelter

Jianggezhuang Naval Basee, China
The Jianggezhuang Navy Base is approximately 15 miles (24 km) east of Qingdao on the Yellow Sea. The base, which appears to be the homeport for China's single Xia-class ballistic missile submarine, spans an entire bay 1.2 miles (1.9 km) across, and includes six piers, a dry dock, numerous service facilities, and the underground submarine facility. The base is also used by Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines.
The Xia-class (Type 092), or Daqingyu-class, was launched from the Bohai shipyard in April 1981 after more than 25 years of design and development work. The nuclear propulsion design was based on the reactor developed for the Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-powered attack submarine first launched in 1971. The Xia hull appears to be a modified Han hull, with the ballistic missile compartment added to the mid-section with a characteristic hump to cover the top of the missile tubes, an approach also used by the United States and the Soviet Union in designing their first SSBNs back in the 1960s.
The Chinese submarine force has very little operational experience in conducting extended submarine operations away from its coastal waters. As a result, for example, the crews of the new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective. By comparison, U.S. SSBNs have conducted over 3,600 deterrent patrols over the past 55 years. In 2005 alone, the U.S. SSBN force conducted 44 patrols (21 patrols in the Pacific), or more than four times the number of SSBN patrols conducted by all other nuclear weapon states combined.

China's North Sea Fleet, Submarine Base HQ

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Pier

Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine, Type 091 (Han Class)

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Submarine Cave Entrance

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Xia SSBN in Dry Dock

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Shore Facilities

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Land Entrance to Submarine Cave

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Wharf at Breakwater

Jianggezhuang Naval Base, Shazikov Pu Bay, Pier

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber Aircraft, China
China operates a force of about 120 aging H-6 intermediate-range bombers of which a couple of dozen may have a secondary nuclear strike mission. Although seen increasingly obsolescent as a modern strike bomber, the H-6 is not as old as the U.S. B-52 and may gain new life as a platform for China’s emerging cruise missile capability. China is thought to be close to introducing the YJ-63 first-generation land-attack cruise missile for delivery by the H-6. We estimate that China maintains a small inventory of nuclear bombs for these aircraft.

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Dangyang Air Base

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Leiyang Air Base

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Anqing Air Base

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Wugong Air Base

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Xian Yaocun Air Base

H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber, Nanjing Dajiaochang-Yuxikou Air Base

Q-5 (Fantan) Fighter/Interceptor Aircraft, China
On January 7, 1972, a modified A-5 fighter-bomber (Q-5A) dropped a low-yield (8 kt) nuclear bomb in a nuclear test at Lop Nur. The employment reportedly used the loft bombing technique. The test was the first – and apparently only – time a Chinese fighter-bomber has been used to deliver a live nuclear weapon and, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “may have been a proof test of a tactical weapon.”
Since then, the Q-5A may have been retired, and there have been no reports that other Q-5s were modified to deliver nuclear weapons. Given its age and short range of only 400 km, any reason for the Chinese to keep the Q-5 with a nuclear strike capability is questionable.

Q-5 (Nanchang Fantan) Fighter-Interceptor, Jianqiao Air Base

Q-5 (Nanchang Fantan) Fighter-Interceptor, Weixian Air Base

Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center, China
The Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center is located approximately 12 miles (20 km) west of the city of Wuzhai in the northwestern part of the Shanxi province some 267 miles (430 km) southwest of Beijing. Although sometime also confusingly referred to as the Taiyuan Space Facility, the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center is 83 miles (134 km) northwest from Taiyuan.
Wuzhai includes two primary launch pads, a rail storage area, and what appear to be several smaller remote launch platforms. The northern pad has a high launch tower and an exhaust duct. The southern pad has what appears to be a crane on rail possibly used to lift the missile off the transport. The southern pad also includes what appears to be a launch pad for use by mobile missile launchers.

Wuzhai: HQ/C3 Center

Wuzhai: Northern Launch Pad

Wuzhai: Exhaust Duct

Wuzhai: Launch Tower

Whuzhai: Southern Launch Pad

Whuzhai: Pad for Mobile Missile Launchers

Whuzhai: Shadow of Missile Crane

Wuzhai: Missile Storage and Final Assembly Building

Wuzhai: Telemetry Station

Wuzhai: Technical Center and Satellite Testing Facility

Whuzhai: Possible Silo

Jiuquan Space Center, China
Ballistic missiles are test-launched from the Jiuquan Space Launch Center in the western part of the Nei Mongol district. This is China’s main space port that is primarily used for space launches such as the Long March rockets, but it is also where the majority of the DF-5 launches took place.
The Jiuquan Space Center includes several launch sites that are used to test launch military ballistic missiles. The primary one appears to be a twin-launch pad facility with rail access located approximately 24 miles (39 km) north of the main Long March launch center. The facility has two launch towers located some 430 meters apart on 50x60-meter launch pads, and connected by a rail system for a mobile tower that may be used to assemble the missile and move it to the launch towers. Exhaust ducts are clearly visible behind each tower. Railheads end next to each launch pad, and two 10-meter vehicles appear to be making their way to the western launch tower.

Jiuquan Space Center, Support Area (possible main operating base)

Jiuquan Space Center, Launch Area/Pad (reported Long March 2F Launch Pad)

Jiuquan Space Center, Launch Area/Pad

Jiuquan Space Center, Launch Area/Pad (Possible Silo)

Jiuquan Space Center, Launch Area

Jiuquan Space Center Missile Test Area

Jiuquan Space Center, Possible Radar or Air Defense Site

Jiuquan Space Center, Support Area

Jiuquan Space Center, Test Area

Jiuquan Space Center, Population Center

Underground Facilities, China
China has a large number of underground facilities. Neither the Chinese nor the U.S. intelligence community will say how many, but during examination of many dozens of satellite images in preparation for this report we found that many military bases indeed have underground facilities. They may not all be “hard and deeply buried,” but placing important assets underground in some form seems to be a common element of China’s military planning.
Underground facilities suggest an intention to protect vulnerable assets or hide them from view. Whereas Chinese airbases typically include one or more underground facilities, U.S. airbases generally do not have underground facilities for aircraft. Conversely, whereas the United States deploys its entire land-based ballistic missiles force in hardened silos, China only has 20 of its longer-range missiles in silos. In the future, it is possible that none of China’s missile force will be silo-based. Other missiles may be hidden in caves, a type of deployment not used by the United States. One of the Chinese long-range missiles rumored to be deployed in caves is the DF-4, and while that may be true for some, we found at least two surface launch sites near Delingha that appear to be operational. A new feature of Chinese airbases also appears to be climate shelters on the tarmac to protect aircraft against rain and sun and from spy satellites.
Between 1964 and the mid- to late-1970s, China carried out a massive construction program, in effect building a duplicate industrial base in the remote regions of China to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of war, initially foreseen with the United States and later with the Soviet Union. This project, called the “Third Line,” encompassed mining, energy production, railways, hydroelectric power, steel factories, and machine building. Many of the new sites were concentrated in the western and southwestern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai, as well as parts of Shaanxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan, away from the more vulnerable coastal cities and provinces. In general, the Chinese tried to use topography for protection, building in narrow valleys or near mountains. The scale of the undertaking was enormous, much larger than Roosevelt’s New Deal or Stalin’s Five-Year Plan, and probably had a negative impact on China’s economic development. The Third Line was accomplished in great secrecy and even today it is not well known or discussed.

Anqing Air Base, Entrance to Underground Facility (Presumed to be for Weapon Storage)

Beidao Air Base, Covered Taxiway

Beijing Shahezhen Air Base, Underground Aircraft Hanger Entrance

Cha-su-chi Air Base, Entrance to Mountain Cave

Chengdu Air Base, Underground End to Runway

Chifeng 2 Air Base, Entrance to Underground Aircraft Hanger

Dezhou Air Base, Covered Taxiway

Feidong Air Base, Underground Hanger Entrance

Feidong Air Base, Underground Facility Entrance

Golmud POL (?) Storage Area

Hainan Dao Underground Entrance

Hainan Dao Submarine Cave Entrance

Jingyuan Air Base, Cave Entrance

Jining Air Base, Entrance to Underground Parking Area

Leiyang Air Base, Aircraft Hanger Partially Underground

Leiyang Air Base, Entrance to Aircraft Hanger Partially Underground

Leiyang Southwest Air Base, Tunnel Entrance

Lingshui Wan, Hainan Dao Submarine Cave Entrance

Malan-Uxxaktal Air Base Weapon Storage Site, Underground Storage Facility

Pulandian Air Base, Tunnel Entrance

Quingshui Air Base, Covered Taxiway

Ranghezhen Air Base, Entrance to Underground Aircraft Hanger

Shanshan Air Base, Covered Taxiway

Suzhou West Air Base, Underground Aircraft Hanger Entrance

Urumqi POL Storage Facility, Underground Tanks

Weifang Air Base, Entrance to Underground Aircraft Area?

Wulumuqi South-Urumqi South Air Base, Entrance to Underground Weapon Storage Facility

Wulumuqi South Possible Underground Facility Entrance

Yangcun Air Base, Entrance to Underground Aircraft Tunnel-Hanger

Yinchuan West Air Base, Entrance to Underground Facility

Yinchuan West Air Base, Entrance to Underground Hanger

Yinchuan West Air Base, Entrance to Underground Storage Area

Zhangjiakou Southeast Air Base, Entrance to Underground Facility

Nuclear Weapons Testing, China
Since China conducted its first nuclear test explosion on October 16, 1964, it has carried out a total of 45 known nuclear test explosions to develop and refine its stockpile of nuclear bombs and warheads. The tests had explosive yields between “low” kt (1 to 10 kt) and 4 Mt. The last atmospheric test took place on October 16, 1980, and the two last underground test were conducted in 1996.
As part of the research for this report, we examined satellite images from the Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nur, where several different locations for vertical and horizontal tests have been reported. We discovered at least one area that appears to be active approximately five miles (eight kilometers) north of Po-cheng-tzu in the Xinjiang providence.
The site includes a large number of facilities along a side road and has five access roads that lead north to the base of the mountain ridge and what appear to be five horizontal tunnels dug into the mountain. Various buildings are located outside each tunnel entrance and one of the entrances appears to be covered with a roof. Each site also clearly shows an area where rock excavated from the mountain has been dumped. Trucks are visible at all entrances except one. One site appears to be more active than the others, with several trucks operating near the tunnel entrance.

Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site: Base Facilities

Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site: Horizontal Tunnel Entrance

Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site: Covered Horizontal Tunnel Entrance

Simulated U.S. Nuclear Strike on Chinese Missile Silos: Fallout
The analysis of the numbers, characteristics and deployment of the strategic nuclear forces of China and the United States presented in our study raises the question of what would be the consequences if these forces were ever used.
Even a rough comparison of the nuclear forces of China and the United States raises basic questions about their deterrent relationship, as the United States currently possesses overwhelming nuclear superiority. The United States has in excess of 2,000 warheads capable of hitting China on short notice. China deploys an estimated 20 ICBMs capable of targeting U.S. cities.
In the first hypothetical nuclear attack scenario, U.S. ballistic missile submarines stationed in the Pacific Ocean fire Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at Chinese DF-5A missile silos located near the city of Luoning in China’s Henan Province. This scenario is termed a "counterforce" attack, where the overwhelming numerical superiorty and capability of U.S. nuclear forces is used to attack opposing Chinese nuclear forces but not directly target population centers. A a full-scale nuclear attack by the United States against China would involve numerous other facilities across the country.
In the second hypothetical nuclear attack scenario we calculated the effects of a Chinese strike against U.S. cities with warheads from these DF-5A ICBMs.This scenarios is termed a "countervalue" attack, in which a smaller number of inaccurate, but high-yield nuclear weapons intentionally target urban areas.
The calculations of the effects of nuclear strikes do not even begin to describe what would actually occur if nuclear weapons were employed. The Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) produced by just two 4 Mt high-altitude atmospheric explosions, for example, would disable communications and electronic equipment across the entire United States. Several million Chinese expatriates also would die in a Chinese countervalue attack against U.S. cities. Even if the United States conducted a first strike on China’s long-range ICBMs, and there was no immediate retaliation, there would still be massive suffering for refugees due to radioactive fallout. And when this unprecedented humanitarian crisis was broadcast back to the United States, the social and economic chaos that would follow from Americans fleeing cities in fear of an eventual Chinese retaliatory strike would deepen the suffering.
These simulations underscore that both a Chinese countervalue strike and a U.S. counterforce strike would inflict millions of civilian casualties and fatalities. If this is not sufficient to deter either side from nuclear use, it is hard to imagine what would.

City of Luoning, Henan Province

Hypothetical Chinese DF-5 Missile Silo Locations
Approximately 20 silo-based DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) make up China’s “primary nuclear deterrent,” according to the U.S. Department of Defense, a statement that reflects that this is the only Chinese missile that can reach targets in all of the continental United States.
The Luoning DF-5A launch group is reportedly “buried deep in the mountains 150 miles (240 km) east of Xian … near the town of Luoning.” These targets are approximately 4,350 miles (7,000 km) from the hypothetical U.S. SSBN deployment area and Trident II D5 launch site. The time-of-flight of the U.S. Trident SLBMs to the Chinese targets would be therefore be about 30 minutes.
We have not yet positively identified Chinese silo locations based on the available GoogleEarth high-resolution imagery or additional QuickBird imagery purchased from DigitalGlobe for this project. Above-ground structures associated with an ICBM silo may not be readily apparent even at the resolution offered by the QuickBird satellite. The hypothetical Chinese silo targets at Luoning were selected with a separation distance of approximately 6.2 miles (10 km), consistent with the separation distance of U.S. and Soviet-built ICBM silos presumably to preclude the possibility of one attacking warhead damaging more than one target silo.

Hypothetical Chinese DF-5 Missile Silo Location

U.S. Nuclear Strike on Chinese Missile Silos: Radioactive Fallout (Dec. Winds)
Calculated fallout patterns from the 20 W88 warhead strike on the DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) silos at Luoning for winds typical of December.
In the case of 20 W88 warheads detonating on the Luoning ICBM silos, we found that the combined fallout patterns would create hazardous conditions reaching over 620 miles (1,000 km) from ground zero. Fallout zones where the 48-hour dose to exposed people exceeds 150 REM would cover 12,360 to 21,620 square miles (32,000 to 56,000 km2). In those zones, survivors would experience severe radiation sickness from hours to days after the explosion, or death. This land mass exceeds the area of the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut. The fallout zone for a 48-hour exposure exceeding 450 REM (death 50 percent likely) cover 6,950 to 14,670 square miles (18,000 to 38,000 km2), and the most intense zone of fallout exceeding 600 REM (death likely) would cover an area of 4,633 to 5,405 square miles (12,000 to 14,000 km2).
The expected fatalities from the strike on the Luoning silo field by 20 U.S. W88 warheads would be 3.5 million, and the number of injuries (predominantly radiation sickness) would be 7.7 million.
5000 REM Dose
2,500 REM Dose
1,000 REM Dose
600 REM Dose
450 REM Dose

Simulated Chinese Strike on U.S. Cities
China’s main nuclear deterrent against the United States has been described as a retaliatory minimum deterrent against countervalue targets with forces on very low or no alert. “Retaliatory” and “countervalue” refer to the fact that the Chinese nuclear doctrine is one of no-first-use, and consistent with that stated policy, the Chinese nuclear weapons capable of attacking the continental United States are not of a quantity or an accuracy that could threaten U.S. nuclear forces, but instead would be capable of targeting population centers. We calculated the effects of a Chinese strike against U.S. cities with warheads from the 20 DF-5A ICBMs that were hypothetical targets in the simulated U.S. strike on China.
A range of 7,456 miles (12,000 km) for the Chinese DF-5A puts cities on the East Coast at risk, including New York City and Washington, D.C. The yield of the warhead mounted on the DF-5A is believed to be from 3 Mt to 5 Mt
An inner zone of near complete destruction (more than 90 percent casualties) would extend 16.2 miles (10 km) from ground zero, and blast and fire damage would extend as far as 21.8 miles (35 km) or more from the ground zero. A blast wave as strong or stronger than that directly under the Hiroshima explosion (35 psi) would cross the island of Manhattan. A firestorm could potentially engulf all of New York City or Los Angeles.

Nuclear Strike on New York City
The output from an HPAC calculation showing the combined nuclear explosive effects of blast, thermal radiation and initial radiation created by a hypothetical detonation of a 4 Mt Chinese nuclear warhead on New York City. The simulation predicted 7.75 million casualties from the nuclear strike.
Zone of 90% Casualties
Calculated Probability of being killed or injured from the nuclear explosion.
Zone of 80% Casualties
Zone of 70% Casualties

Nuclear Strike on Los Angeles
The output from an HPAC calculation showing the combined nuclear explosive effects of blast, thermal radiation and initial radiation created by a hypothetical detonation of a 4 Mt Chinese nuclear warhead on Los Angeles. The simulation predicted 4.7 million casualties from the strike.
Calculated Probability of being killed or injured from the nuclear explosion.